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The dictator game (DG) is one of the most popular methods for measuring sharing
behaviors. However, the matter of goods used in the game has rarely been examined
and discussed. We conducted a study in which all participants played standard version
of DG in one of the three versions – “money,” “food,” or “daily life objects” sharing.
Further, we wanted to expand the generalizability of our findings by investigating whether
patterns in sharing various goods are independent of culture and the level of market
integration. Thus, the study was conducted among people who function daily under
the conditions of low market integration (109 Tsimane’ – forager-horticulturists from
Bolivian Amazon) and in a society highly integrated with the market-based economy
(85 Polish people). We observed that among both Polish and Tsimane’ people the
participants were equally likely to share money, food and small, daily life objects with
an unknown partner, which implies that generosity might not be related with the type of
possessed resources. However, regardless of the kind of goods given, Tsimane’ people
were less eager to share with anonymous others than Polish people. We present several
implications of our findings for studies on generosity and altruism.
Keywords: dictator game, money, food, sharing, generosity
INTRODUCTION
The dictator game (DG) is one of the most popular methods for measuring sharing behaviors
(Engel, 2011). Many variations of the DG have been developed in order to capture different types
of decisions and economic strategies. Originally developed by Kahneman et al. (1986), DG became
very popular over the past 30 years, mostly because of its simplicity and accuracy in turning
assumptions into measurable decisions (Engel, 2011). Based on observation of decisions made in
this economic game, scientists came to the conclusion that people are more eager to share than
homo economicus theory would suggest, i.e., the frequency and quantity of shared goods often
exceeds the assumed, rational and self-centered social exchange (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). To date,
studies have shown that this pattern is observable across different cultures (Henrich et al., 2001).
Only by year 2009, DG was described in over 130 empirical papers, presenting over 616 various
procedures and versions of the game (Engel, 2011). Differences included conditions of reciprocity
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(Ben-Ner et al., 2004b; Diekmann, 2004), degree of uncertainty
and social distance between the players (Charness and Gneezy,
2008), partner’s gender and personality (Ben-Ner et al., 2004a),
and minimal social cues (Rigdon et al., 2009). Nevertheless, the
matter of goods used in the game has rarely been examined and
discussed. In some studies, researchers used objects different than
money (for example tobacco) to examine sharing patterns (e.g.,
Henrich et al., 2001), but possible effects and implications of this
fact were not controlled. It seems quite surprising that to date this
fundamental aspect of widely recognized measure of economic
behaviors has not received enough scientific attention. Possibly,
different goods of similar value used in canonical setting of DG
can influence decisions of a player.
Former studies suggest that generosity might depend on
monetary and non-monetary contexts. For example, it has been
shown peoples’ inclinations to act pro-socially may be weaker in
the contexts involving money (Vohs et al., 2006, 2008; Pfeffer and
DeVoe, 2009). Relatedly, people seem to be more generous when
involved in non-monetary exchange – for instance, they return
the favor of a small gifts more often (Kube et al., 2012). Food
exchange is also an important component of human cooperation
and altruistic behavior (Kaplan et al., 1985, 2005). It developed
earlier than money exchange in human history and in certain
circumstances it is more often practiced. For example, some
anthropologists argue that among Inuit hunter-gatherers living
in the Canadian Arctic, food is exchanged more often than other
goods or services (Kishigami, 2004).
In the light of above assumptions, it seems possible that
the type of goods transferred within the DG might influence
the willingness to share and that earlier studies involving DG
could bring different results, if goods different than money were
used (e.g., food or daily life objects). Therefore, we expected
to observe a larger offer with non-monetary goods (or, more
specifically, with foods). To test this prediction we conducted
a study aimed at verification of the hypothesis that different
types of goods involved in the DG can result in varied decisions
on how much to share with a partner. Further, previous
studies on DG were often conducted among participants from
different cultures (Henrich et al., 2001; Gurven, 2004). Thus,
we wanted to expand the generalizability of our findings by
investigating whether patterns in sharing various goods are
culturally independent.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
To test the cross-cultural pattern of economic behaviors
performed in DG with different types of goods involved,
we collected data among people who function daily
under the conditions of low market integration (Tsimane’
forager-horticulturists – Amazonian Indians) and in a society
highly integrated with the market-based economy (Poland).
Tsimane’ are a forager-horticulturists population of 8000
people scattered around a 100 villages in the region of Maniqui
River (Huanca, 2006). Their level of integration with Bolivian
economy, culture and society varies from a fairly traditional
way of living (high isolation, performing shifting cultivation,
hunting, fishing, and plant foraging) to relative integration (i.e.,
formal education, inhabiting settlements that can be reached by
road, being regularly employed and relying on wages) (Godoy
et al., 2010; Godoy, 2012). Poland is a country in Central Europe
with a GDP of about 15,000 US$ per capita in 2015 (World
Bank, 2016) and is a part of the European Union. It represents
a modern industrialized society highly integrated with market
economy.
The study was conducted among 109 Tsimane’, of whom 59
were females aged between 15 and 40 (M = 26.2, SD = 6.8) and
50 were males aged between 18 and 40 (M = 28.3, SD = 6.5).
Tsimane’ participants were recruited among people living in four
villages along the Maniqui River – Campo Bello, Las Palmas,
Uasichi and Las Minas. These villages are located in similar
proximity to the nearest town (approximately 3 h by canoe).
Their inhabitants rely on foraging and small-scale agriculture,
and only occasionally visit the town in order to sell surplus food
products and purchase goods such as sugar and oil. We observed
no significant differences in the level of market integration of
the participants. The Polish sample comprised 85 participants
of whom 45 were females aged between 17 and 39 (M = 21.6,
SD = 3.7) and 40 were males aged between 18 and 30 (M = 21.7,
SD = 2.6). Participants in Poland were recruited at university
campuses in Wroclaw and Warsaw.
Procedure
All participants played standard version of DG (Kahneman et al.,
1986) in an experimental room (hut in case of Tsimane’) where
their anonymity was secured. They were instructed that they were
matched at random with another participant, and that they can
share some money or goods with him or her. They were asked
to decide on how much money or how many objects they want
to give the partner and told that they can keep the remaining
money or objects for themselves. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the three conditions – “money,” “food,” or
“daily life object” (Tsimane: money – n= 38, food – n= 36, daily
life object – n = 35; Poles: money – n = 29, food – n = 27, daily
life object – n= 29); in each condition they could share 10 items.
We instructed our participants that the study is anonymous, and
that the recipient will not know who shared money, food or
objects with them.
Polish participants in the first condition received 10 PLN (in 1
PLN coins) and were instructed to share it between anonymous
partner and themselves. In the second condition the participants
received 10 candy bars and in the third condition they were
asked to share items useful in daily life (i.e., 10 pens). The
value of all three types of items was approximately the same.
Similar procedure was applied to Tsimane’, except that in this
case the “money” were 10 bolivianos (BOB; in 1 boliviano
coins), “food” items were 10 small packs of cookies, and “objects
useful in daily life” were 10 fish hooks. Again, the value of
all types of items was approximately the same. It is hard to
compare if subjective values of our objects were smaller/higher
for Tsimane or Poles. However, we would like to highlight that
main aim of our study was not to compare results from this two
populations.
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Ethics Statement
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki. The study protocol was approved by the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) of the University of Wroclaw (Wroclaw,
Poland) and by the Great Tsimane’ Council (the governing body
of the Tsimane’). Polish participants provided written, informed
consent prior to study inclusion, and due to the low levels of
literacy among Tsimane’, we only obtained informed oral consent
from the participants in this group.
RESULTS
All analyses were computed with IBM SPSS Software, version
22. Significant results of Shapiro-Wilk’s tests in both Tsimane’
and Polish samples across all three conditions indicated that the
number of items transferred to the partner was not distributed
normally (p < 0.001). Hence, in the further analyses we used
non-parametric tests. For Mann–Whitney U-test we computed
Hodges–Lehman estimation to obtain 95% confidence intervals.
Significance level was set to alpha= 0.025, as we predicted higher
generosity when sharing non-monetary goods.
In order to test the differences in generosity with
different goods involved in the Polish sample we performed
Kruskal–Wallis test with condition (“money,” “food,” or “daily life
object”) as an independent factor and amount of money/quantity
of objects given to the partner as a dependent variable. We
found no differences between the conditions, H2 = 1.7, p= 0.43.
Pairwise comparisons based on Mann–Whitney U-test indicate,
that the effect sizes for each pair of conditions were marginal
(food vs. money: U = 384.5, p = 0.9, η2 = 0.003; food vs. small
object: U = 336.5, p = 0.34, η2 = 0.016; money vs. small object:
U = 348, p= 0.21, η2 = 0.026; none of the pairwise comparisons
survived Bonferroni correction). We also checked gender-related
differences in generosity, but found no significant difference
between men and women, U = 812, p = 0.4, η2 = 0.009, 95% CI
[0.0, 0.0].
Analogous Kruskal–Wallis test in Tsimane’ sample revealed
no differences in terms of shared goods quantity, H2 = 0.22,
p = 0.90. Pairwise comparisons based on Mann–Whitney U-test
indicate, that the effect sizes for each pair of conditions were
again marginal (food vs. money: U = 657.5, p= 0.69, η2 = 0.003;
food vs. small object: U = 629, p = 0.99, η2 = 0.0003; money
vs. small object: U = 637.5, p = 0.68, η2 = 0.002; none of the
comparisons survived Bonferroni correction). Interestingly, we
observed a significant difference between women (Mrank = 60.8)
and men (Mrank = 50.1), indicating lower generosity of the latter,
U = 1183, p= 0.016, η2 = 0.05, 95% CI [0.0, 0.0].
Finally, we compared Tsimane’ and Polish samples within each
of the three conditions. We found significant differences in (a)
“food” condition (U = 943.5, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.71, 95% CI
[−5.0, −5.0]), showing lower tendency to share food in Tsimane’
(Median = 0) as compared to Poles (Median = 5); (b) “money”
condition (U = 1029, p< 0.001, η2 = 0.65, 95% CI [−5.0,−5.0])
indicating lower tendency to share money with others in Tsimane’
(Median = 0) as compared to Poles (Median = 5); and (c) “daily
life object” condition (U = 957, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.63, 95% CI
FIGURE 1 | Average amount of goods given to an anonymous partner
in different versions of dictator game played by Tsimane’ and Poles.
Single outliers are marked with stars; error bars denote standard error values.
[−7.0, −5.0]), showing lower tendency to share daily life objects
in Tsimane’ (Median = 0) as compared to Poles (Median = 5).
For mean values see: Figure 1.
DISCUSSION
Results of the current study indicate that applying different
types of goods in the DG returned similar results among the
Polish and Tsimane’ people. We observed that in both cultures,
the participants were equally likely to share money, food and
small, daily life objects with an unknown partner. The findings
of our research are important for several reasons. First, this
study suggests that generosity might not be related with the
type of possessed resources, and second, it seems that type of
applied goods in DG does not influence the level of generosity
within cultures. Based on our research we can suggest that
goods of similar objective value represent also similar subjective
value to the participants, and that experimental DG paradigms
can be created based on both monetary and non-monetary
reward. Finally, our findings allow researchers to compare
former results obtained with different types of goods of similar
value.
The fact that in our study generosity did not depend on the
type of shared resources seems to be rather surprising, because
food sharing seems to be an especially important component
of human cooperation and altruistic behavior (Kaplan et al.,
1985, 2005; Bailey, 1991). Additionally, money may decrease the
level of human pro-social orientation (Pfeffer and DeVoe, 2009;
Gasiorowska and Helka, 2012) and can increase one’s efforts to
attain personal goals (Vohs et al., 2006, 2008). Further, monetary
and non-monetary reward often represent different values to the
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participants, most importantly because money can be exchanged
for anything a person needs. Perhaps, the results we observed in
our study resulted from all goods representing similar objective
value to the participants, as (a) the amount of money that was
to be shared was rather small, and (b) the non-monetary goods
were quite useful to the participants. Perhaps, this equalized
the subjective value of items applied in our experiment and led
to similar outcomes across conditions. In future studies it can
be investigated whether the objective value of applied items is
actually reflected in subjective perception of the shared goods’
values.
Crucially, we found similar pattern of results across two
culturally different samples of Poles and Tsimane’ – within
each group, participants were equally likely to share each
type of the possessed goods/items. The results create a space
for the hypothesis, that the type of goods involved in the
DG does not influence the level of generosity among players
representing various cultures. To test such hypothesis, further
studies involving participants representing more diverse cultures
(both traditional and western) should be conducted.
It needs to be noted that regardless of the kind of goods
given, Tsimane’ people were less eager to share with anonymous
others than Polish people. These results remain in line with the
former findings showing that the degree of market integration
together with the payoffs to cooperation are positively correlated
with the level of observed cooperation in experimental economic
games (Henrich et al., 2001). It is also possible, that the goods
provided by the experimenter represented higher subjective value
to the Tsimane’ participants than to the Polish participants, and
this is why the former were less likely to share the items with
an unknown person. On the other hand, metaanalyses suggest
that in traditional societies, dictators are significantly more
generous as compared to players from Western, highly developed
countries (Engel, 2011). However, these sources are based on
a limited number of studies on economic behaviors conducted
among members of primal societies, and the knowledge on
patterns of their economic decisions remains rather scarce.
Further investigations are required to fully understand cultural
foundations on generosity presented in monetary and non-
monetary contexts.
Interestingly, we found that in Tsimane’, men were less eager
to share than women. This is rather an expected result (Engel,
2011) that remains in line with former findings suggesting,
that women are typically less selfish than men (Eckel and
Grossman, 1998). This difference might result from women being
more oriented toward others and concentrated on interpersonal
relations as compared to men, who are focused more on
their own competence and goal achievements (Eagly, 2009). As
majority of studies conducted in Western countries suggested
that in women are more generous in DG than men (Engel,
2011) our result among Poland should be perceived as rare
exception.
Finally, we observed extremely low readiness to share among
Tsimane’. In the previous study conducted among Tsimane’ by
Gurven (2004) the mean offer given in the DG was 32%, while
here it was 5.9% (average for all types of goods declared to share).
Similar to the study conducted by Gurven (2004), in our study
economic games played among Tsimane’ were one-shot decisions
performed under anonymous conditions, which should therefore
eliminate any motivation to share based on status or reputation
of the potential partner. We did not involve reciprocity setting,
that could raise more altruistic decisions based on anticipated
return from the partner. If the participants were instructed
that the partner was about to take their position in the next
round, they could be more generous, hoping for the partner to
repay the same amount. However, in Gurven’s (2004) study, the
participants played a few economic games in a row. Perhaps, the
more reciprocal nature of other games the participants played
had influenced their decisions to share in DG. Further, in the
original Gurven’s (2004) experiment, the participants were given
20 Bs by the experimenter, whereas, in our experiment this was 10
Bs. It means that the participants of Gurven’s (2004) experiment
would keep on average 13.6 Bs, whereas our participants kept
on average 9 Bs – in this way, the difference between the two
studies seems less pronounced. Finally, as suggested by Gurven
(2004) himself, “with an increasing reliance on market goods
to reduce temporal variation in food- and health-related risks,
households become more self-sufficient, and may be less likely
to share”; thus, altruism may decrease with increasing market
involvement. As our experiment was conducted 15 years after
the original study by Gurven (2004), and during these years
the Tsimane’ became more integrated to the local economy,
the lower willingness to share might simply be a reflection of
these changes. However, at the current stage of research it is
hard to determine, which of these explanations are the most
likely causes of the discrepancies in sharing patterns among
the Tsimane’. A certain limitation of the present study is that
we did not control the subjective value of presented goods.
Although in both cultures the items were perceived as small gifts,
it cannot be guaranteed that the applied items were perceived as
equally valuable by the Tsimane and Poles. However, it should
be noted that the main focus of the study were within-group
comparisons.
To sum up, the results of our study indicate that in DG,
generosity and willingness to share can be measured with various
goods, such as food or small objects. These findings broaden
the knowledge on methods used to study economic behaviors,
and open new, different questions on bases of generosity and
altruism.
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